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In The Supreme Court
of The State of Utah
RONALD E. ELLIS and
SARAH ELLIS, husband
and wife,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,

Case No.
12,499

vs.
WANDA F. HATHAWAY,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPELLANTS BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action brought by Ronald E. Ellis to
recover damages for injuries sustained as a result of
a two car collision caused by the negligence of the
defendant, Wanda F. Hathaway, and for damages
sustained by plaintiff, Sarah Ellis, for loss of support, companionship, love and affection causing her
mental anguish and damages to her health and well
1

being, as a result of the two car collision caused Ly
defendant's negligence.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The jury found in favor of the defendant and
against the plaintiffs, no cause of action.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiffs seek an order remanding the case to
the trial court for a new trial.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
At approximately 4:00 p.m. on December 7, 1968
plaintiff, Ronald E. Ellis, collided with defendant,
in a two car collision at the intersection of US-189 ·
(which is a north-south extension of University:
Avenue in Provo, Utah) and SR-78 (which is an
East-West road designated as 3700 North Street in:
Provo, Utah) (TR-95). US-189 has a north bound,
lane and a south bound lane, except at the subject'
intersection where additional lanes have been in·
stalled for those turning on and off US-189 to the ,
East or West. (TR-20, See Exhibit 13). The intersec·
tion, had caution lights for North-South traffic and
stop signs and flashing red lights for East-West
traffic. (TR-20).
1
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Defendant approached the intersection from the
West and stopped at the stop sign. (TR-265). Plain·
2

tiff, Ronald E. Ellis, approached the intersection
from the North and as he got to the intersection,
the defendant abruptly pulled into the middle of
the road and stopped. (TR-57, TR-95, TR-265, TR266). Plantiiff immediately applied his brakes and
swerved right in an attempt to miss the defendant's
automobile. (TR-58, TR-95). Plaintiff's vehicle
struck the left rear door of the defendant's vehicle.
(TR-96). Defendant saw no traffic and she had no
obstruction to her view. (TR-266, TR-43, TR-47).
The first time she saw plaintiff's car was after the
entered the intersection and saw plaintiff's automobile two car lengths from her whereupon she
stopped. (TR-266, TR-273). Plaintiff and Nyle Davis,
a passenger in plaintiff's car, and Officer James C.
Hoyt, placed the point of impact in the South bound
lane of traffic near the turn lane. (TR-22, TR-57,
TR-96). The defendant remembered the point of impact outside the south bound lane in the turn lane.
(TR-266).
Plaintiff Ronald E. Ellis, reinjured his hand
in the collision and was treated for it. The hand had
been injured previously in an earlier industrial
accident. (TR-103, 104). On the 7th day of January,
1969, plaintiff and his attorney, James Nixon, met
with Allen Thomas, an agent for Farmers Insurance
3
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Company. (TR-107, TR-73). (TR-282). At that
ing, plaintiff agreed to accept the sum of $2,640.00 a1
damages to the vehicle (TR-286) and a second pay.,
ment of $859.00, of which 361.00 was payment for
car rental and $489.00 was payment for injury to
plaintiff's hand. (TR-289, TR-83, TR-110). There.
upon plaintiff signed a document which purports to
release the defendant. There is dispute concerning
what was discussed at the meeting. Plaintiff and his
attorney, James Nixon, stated that the only injury
discussed was the injury of plaintiff's hand. (TR-110,
TR-75). Neither plaintiff nor his attorney were
aware of any injury to plaintiff's neck. (TR-110.
TR-75). Mr. Thomas remembers with uncertainty
that he was aware of headaches, neck or back pains.
(TR-288). However, there was no mention of any
injury except the injury to the plaintiff's hand in
Mr. Thomas' memorandum to the insurace company.
(TR-296).

1
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On or about the 20th day of January, 1969, plaintiff began suffering severe pains in his neck and
thereafter was examined by Dr. Kyle C!ark and Dr.
Monnahan, who referred plaintiff to Dr. Eugene
Chapman. (TR-113). Plaintiff has been under Dr.
Chapman's treatment since the 5th of February, 1969.
(TR-168). Plaintiff was hospitalized three times
4

and received physical therapy from Utah Valley
Hospital and incurred doctor bills and hospital bills
in the amount of $1,927.16. (TR-116, 130). Plaintiff
was forced to change occupations and at the time of
trial was attending school in a effort to retain himself. (TR-118). At the end of trial, plaintiff made a
motion to view the premises of the accident which
motion was denied. (TR-304).

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN GIVING IN8TRUCTION NO. 11 ON UNAVOIDABLE ACCIDENT.
POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY THAT DEFENDANT WAS
NEGLIGENT AS A MATTER OF LAW.
POINT III
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO VIEW THE PREMISES.
ARGUMENT

POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN GIVING INSTRUC5

TION NO. 11 ON UNA VOIDABLE ACCIDENT.
Instruction No 11 on unavoidable accident
not requested by either counsel for plaintiffs or\
defendant. (See plaintiffs' requested
(R-59 to R-74) and defendant's requested instructions (R-75 to R-91). The instruction was given on
the initiative of the Court and has its basis in an
erroneous assumption of the Court found in Instruction No. 2 wherein the last paragraph states:
"The defendant further alleges that the
accident herein before referred to was an
unavoidable accident."
As stated, there is no basis for the above statement of the Court inasmuch as defendant's answer
does not raise a defense of unavoidable accident (R-8,
R-9) and the defense was never mentioned during
trial.
With no evidence or pleading to support an in·
struction, the Court nevertheless gave Instruction
No. 11 to the jury as follows:
"The law recognizes unavoidable accidents. An unavoidable accident is one which
occurs in such a manner that it cannot justly be said to have been proximately caused
by negligence as those terms are herein de6

fined .. In the event a party is damaged by an
unavoidable accident, he has no right to
recover, since the law requires that a person
be injured by the fault or negligence of
another as a prerequisite to any right to recover damages."
The above instruction is prejudicial to plaintiffs'
case in that it distorts the entire thrust of the case
and allows that jury to decide the case against plaintiffs upon a basis that was never a part of the
trial or the case until the court erroneously made
unavoidable accident an issue in the case by its Instruction No. 11.
Instructions on unavoidable accident have been
the subject of recent pronouncements of this Court. It
should be noted that the instructions discussed hereinafter were requested by counsel as distinguished
from the instant case where counsel did not request
an instruction on unavoidable accident but rather the
instruction was supplied by the court. As stated in
the case of W oodlwuse v. Johnson, 20 U2d 210, 436 P2d
442 (1968), instructions on unavoidable accident
"should be given with caution and only where the
evidence would justify it." (emphasis added) The
court was concerned with "the practice sometimes
followed by defense counsel of tossing a requested
7

instruction on unavoidable accident into the hoppe 1
with numerous other form defense instructions in
practically any type of negligence case." Should not
the same caution be given with similar import to
trial judges to give instructions on their own initia.
tive only when the pleadings and evidence woulrl
justify an instruction on unavoidable accident?
The reasons plaintiffs are prejudiced by an instruction on unavoidable accident are those stated
in the California case of Butigan v. Yellow Cab, 49
Cal 652, 320 P2d 500, 65 ALR 2d 1, which case was
cited in the dissent in the Woodhouse case and also
in Wagner v. Olsen, 482 P2d 707 (1971) wherein the
California court said:
"The instruction is not only unnecessary,
but it is also confusing. When the jurors are
told that 'in law we recognize what is termed
an unavoidable accident or inevitable accident' they may get the impression that
unavoidability is the issue to be decided and
that, if proved, it constitutes a separate
ground of non-liability of the defendant,
th us they may be misled as to the proper
manner of determining liability, that is,
solely on the basis of negligence." (emphasis
added)
8

The above criticisms of the unavoidable accident
instruction are compounded in the instant case
where unavoidable accident was never an issue until
made an issue by the judge. 5 Am Jur 2d 810 states
the rule of law as follows:
"Error generally results from instructions
which tend to mislead the jury so that they
reach a different result than they would
have reached but for the error, or where
there is a serious misdirection in the charge
which excludes from the consideration of the
jury a proper issue or which probably prejudicially affects the substantial rights of
the complaining party or which results in a
miscarriage of justice. Instructions founded
on assumptions of the court based on conclusions that should be exclusively the province of the jury constitute prejudicial error."
Section 811, states:
"It is the duty of the court to instruct the
jury upon the theory of the party requesting
the charge provided such theory is pleaded
and supported by evidence, and effects a material right. Where the instruction is not so

founded upon appellants theory and is calculated to mislead the jury in considering
9

the facts of the case, the judgment should
be reversed ... where a question of fact material to the case, upon which there is no
evidence to support a finding is submitted
to the jury by the trial court prejudicial
error results." (emphasis added)

It is submitted that prejudicial error as defined
above was committed by the court and misdirected
the jury and introduced improper issues into the
case which materially effected the outcome and ver· I
diet of the jury.
I
I

An excellent article found in 65 ALR 2d from
page 1 to page 138 entitled, "Unavoidable Accident
Instruction" supports plaintiff's position that the unavoidable accident instruction was prejudicial and
constitutes reversible error to-wit:
(1) On page 33, the editor states that "in
order to give foundation for any sort of 'accident' instruction (including unavoidable
accident) there must be in the record evidence which would give legal support to a
finding that the occurrence complained of
was of the nature dictated by the instruction."
(2) On page 131, the article lists cases in
10

which the instruction of unavoidable accident, or a verdict for the defendant, was reversible error in that the jury was mislead
because the accident was certainly caused
through the negligence of someone. Among
the cases cited was the Colorado case of
Herdt v. Darbin, 126 Colo 355, 249 P2d 822
(1932) which is a factually similar case to
the instant case involving a collision at a
highway intersection at a time when visibility was good and there was no hazard of
weather or highway condition whereupon
the court held that it was reversible error
to give the instruction since the accident had
to be someone's fault. In Halleck v. Brown,
330 P 2d 852, (Cal App 2d 1958) which involved a similar street intersection collision
the court said, "it was sheer nonsense to say
that both drivers could be found free from
negligence" and held the unavoidable accident instruction to be prejudicial.
The unavoidable accident issue raised after trial
of the case is certainly material in that the case did
not contain any basis for such an instruction. The
effect of such an instruction can lead only to confusion and misdirection on the part of the jury.
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The real issue in the case was whether or not the
plaintiff, Ronald Ellis, was bound by the provisions
of the release. Instead of focusing on the real issue,
the Court introduced a new issue into the case upon
which the jury could very well have determined was
the real issue in the case and it is more probab:e than
not that the jury considered the possibility of an 1
unavoidable accident before it deliberated on the
technical and legal ramifications of the release. The
jury having an easy way out of deciding the issue of 'I
the
may have decided against the plaintiff by \
finding the accident unavoidable; a concept upon .
which there was no evidence. The danger of a jury I
taking the easy way out is discussed in the case of
Mawyer v. Thomas, 199 Va. 897, 103 SE.2d 217 (1958)
found in G5 AL "R, 2d 54, wherein the Court stated
that where "on plaintiff's evidence the defendant
was negligent, while on defendant's evidence p 1 aintiff was negligent, and there was no evidence that
the accident happened without the negligence of
either or was unavoidable," it was held error to instruct on the subject of unavoidable accident and
moreover, that the error was pre.iudicia 1 in that case,
the court observing that "the instruction gave the

jury an easy way of avoiding instead of deciding the
issue made by the evidence in the case." (emphasis
added)
12

It is logical to assume that the case was decided

upon the basis of unavoidable accident and the non
negligence of defendant because the jury found
against both Ronald Ellis and Sarah Ellis. The release would not affect the verdict for Sarah Ellis,
but Instruction No. 30 (R-120) states that:
"You may also not award any damages to
Sarah Ellis unless you find that the defendant was negligent thereby causing injury to
Ronald Ellis and the said Ronald Ellis was
not contributorily negligent proximatey
thereby contributing to his own injuries."
It is obvious that the combinations of jury think-

ing are multiple in the above situation. For example,
if the jury found the defendant not negligent the
verdict would be against both plaintiffs. It is submitted that based on the evidence and jury instructions the only way for defendant to be found not
negligent is upon the principle of unavoidable accident.
There is no way to know the basis upon which the
jury found for defendant and against plaintiffs,
however, the unavoidable accident instruction could
very well be the basis of the jury decision and since·
unavoidable accident wasn't a proper issue in the
case, plaintiffs are entitled to a new trial based upon
13

proper instructions which fairly instruct the jury
upon the law involved in the case.

POINT JI
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY THAT DEFENDANT WAS
NEGLIGENT AS A MATTER OF LAW.
Based on the evidence produced at trial, plaintiffs requested that the Court give Plaintiffs' Requested Instructions No. 1 and No. 2 (R-59, R-60) as
follows:
"You are instructed that the Court finds
as a matter of law that the defendant,
Wanda F. Hathaway, was guilty of negligence which was the proximate cause of the
collision in this case.''
"You are instructed that the defendant in
failing to remain stopped at the stop sign
and in failing to see the plaintiff, Ronald
E. Ellis, was negligent as a matter of law."
Had not the Court erroneously given Instruction
No. 11 on unavoidable accident, as discussed hereinbefore, it is possible that the Judge would have
given plaintiffs' requested Instructions 1 and 2. The

14

evidence is clear that there was no obstruction to defendant's vision and that she failed to see the plaintiff until he was within two car lengths of her. (R265, 266). Upon seeing plaintiff she stopped her
automobile and the collision occurred. (R-266). There
was no evidence as to plaintiff's contributory negligence and based upon the above facts the Court
should have ruled that defendant was negligent
as a matter of law inasmuch as reasonable minds
would not disagree that defendant was negligent in
failing to remain stopped behind the stop sign and
in failing to see plaintiff, which failure was the
proximate cause of the accident. Utah Code Annotated 41-6-74.lO(b)
"Vehicle entering stop or yield intersection.
Except when directed to proceed by a police
officer or traffic-control signal, every driver
of a vehicle approaching a stop intersection
indicated by a stop sign shall stop as required by Section 41-6-99 and after having
stopped shall yield the right of way to any
vehicle which has entered the intersection
from another highway or which is approaching so closely on another highway as to constitute an immediate hazard during the time
when such driver is moving across or within

15

the intersection."
The court's failure to so instruct is further evidence of the prejudicial effect of the erroneous un.
avoidable accident instruction. An instruction on de.
fedant's negligence as requested would have put the
case in clear focus and would require the jury to deliberate on the real issues of the case involving the
release and the question of a mutual mistake. However, the failure to instruct as to negligence and the
erroneous instruction on unavoidable accident caused
the jury to misdirect their deliberations back to the
accident and its unavoidability and to deliberate on
erroneous issues which should never have been a part
of the lawsuit. The prejudicial effect of the negligence intructions is very much like the effect of the
unavoidable accident instruction previously discussed in that issues are created which can confuse
the jury.
Had not unavoidable accident been introduced
into the case by the Judge, the above instructions on
negligence would have been proper and would have
portrayed the true picture of th accident and caused
the jury to deliberate on the jury question of the
effect of the release. This Court should remedy the
prejudicial error of the trial judge by remanding the
case back to the District Court for a new trial.
16

POINT III
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO VIEW THE PREMISES.
Plaintiffs timely made a motion to view the
premises and stated the reasons for requesting the
view. (R-304). The Court denied plaintiffs' motion
which denial was prejudicial to plaintiffs' case, inasmuch as the Court failed to instruct the jury as
to defendant's negligence as requested by plaintiffs.
The jury view would have cleared up any misconceptions the jury may have had concerning the actual
conditions of the accident, to-wit; the view the defendant had of the highway and the lack of any obstruction to that view. The matter is doubly prejudicial to plaintiffs because the Court introduced the
erroneous concept of unavoidable accident into the
case, which instruction would be less confusing and
misleading to the jury had the jury had the opportunity to view the premises and evaluate the evidence
adduced in Court.
The denial of plaintiffs' motion would not be too
critical to plaintiffs' case had the Judge given plaintiffs' requested instructions, but when the Court_ refused to instruct on defendant's negligence and
introduced the unsolicited instruction of unavoidable
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accident, the sum total of the Court's actions is pre.
judicial and reversible error and plaintiffs are en.
titled to a new trial which fairly comports to the
law and fact questions involved in the case.
CONCLUSION
The Trial Court erred in the following respects:
(1) The Court, on its own initiative, created an erroneous allegation of alleged facts in Instruction No.
2 and embodied that erroneous assumption in an unavoidable accident Instruction No. 11; (2) the Court
failed to instruct the jury on defendant's negligence
as a matter of law as requested, and (3) the Court
denied plaintiffs' motion to view the premises. The
effect of the above error is to distort the case and
create a situation wherein the jury is improperly
instructed in the law to apply to the facts brought
out in trial. Each error is compounded by the exist·
ence of the other error committed by the Court and
the sum total of the Court's error is prejudicial to
plaintiffs' case. This Court shuold reverse the trial
court and remand the case for a new trial wherein
the issues involved will be properly introduced to
the jury and the Court will properly instruct that
jury in the law involved.
18

Respectfully submitted,
S. REX LEWIS, for:
HOW ARD AND LEWIS
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
120 East 300 North
Provo, Utah 84601
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